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MARGRIT MÜLLER 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ON 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN SWITZERLAND 
 
 
Europe has been composed of a large number of large and small countries with 
varying internal rules and norms, and the differences are still remarkable.1 The lit-
erature on types of capitalism, for example, highlights common features for some 
of the European countries during specific periods of time, and even within the 
European Union not convergence, but uneasy rivalry seems to have prevailed.2 
Swiss firms had to take into account the different national rules, if they wanted to 
successfully do business with and in these countries. Further more, the cultural di-
versity and the federal structure of Switzerland had led to the evolution of a vari-
ety of rules within the country itself. Firms were thus used to cope with different 
legal and cultural systems both at home and abroad. 
Up to the middle of the 1980s there seems to have been little pressure from the 
export-oriented branches to adapt internal rules, standards and norms to those of 
other European countries. The share of any country in total exports would hardly 
have justified such an endeavour. The situation changed in 1985, when the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC) decided to create a single internal market. The 
planned abolition of technical barriers to trade threatened to put Swiss firms at a 
disadvantage compared with their competitors in the EEC. In the following years, 
the intensification of European integration had a deep impact on institutional 
change, because national legislation had to be modified in order to make it con-
form or at least compatible with the rules and standards applied within the EEC. 
The primary objective of this far-reaching process of institutional ‘Europeaniza-
tion’ was to avoid a loss of competitiveness for firms located in Switzerland, but 
by and by it was increasingly perceived as an opportunity to facilitate economic 
reforms and accelerate the pace of deregulation and privatisation.3 
The focus of this contribution is on the role of business associations as interme-
diaries between business and politics in the process of ‘Europeanization’ as a con-
sequence of institutional integration.4 Did business associations support or hinder 
                                                           
1 According to the Ifo Database for Institutional Comparisons in Europe institutional divergence is 
quite pronounced among the EC- and EFTA-countries: www.cesifo.de/DICE. 
2 Katzenstein, P. (1985). Small States in World Markets. Industrial Policy in Europe, Ithaca: Cor-
nell University Press. Hall, P. A., Soskice, D., eds (2001). Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional 
Foundation of Comparative Advantage. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Wilks, S. (1996) Regulatory 
compliance and capitalist diversity in Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 
536–559 
3 There are some parallels, but also major differences to the impact of European integration on the 
process of Europeanization in Sweden. See the contribution of Kersti Ullenhag in this volume. 
4 North, D.C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge et 
al.: Cambridge University Press 
the adaptation of national legislation to the rules established within the EEC? 
What was their role with regard to European integration in their own perspective? 
In which areas did the process of European integration lead to institutional adapta-
tions? Did the business associations themselves become more European? What 
was the impact of other international organisations (GATT/WTO, OECD, UNO) 
on institutional change in comparison with European integration? 
I shall concentrate on the most influential business association, the federation 
of trade and industry SHIV (Schweizerischer Handels- und Industrieverein), the 
associations of the main export-oriented branches machines and chemicals, VSM 
(Verein Schweizerischer Maschinen-Industrieller) and SSCI (Swiss Society of 
Chemical Industries) as well as on the federation of the inward oriented branches 
SGV (Schweizerischer Gewerbeverband). 
 
EUROPEANIZATION IN THE FOREFRONT OF 
THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 
 
SWISS FEDERATION OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY (SHIV) 
 
On the national level, the SHIV participated in practically all government 
committees dealing with economic policies and legal reforms. It represented the 
economic interests of its members, and these interests were identified through sur-
veys or at internal meetings and conferences.5 The SHIV was associated with sev-
eral international organisations: UNICE (Union des Industries des pays de la 
Communauté européenne), CIFE (Conseil des féderations industrielles d’Europe), 
BIAC (Business and Industry Advisory Committee to OECD) and ICC (Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce). In the late 1980s, participation in the UNICE be-
came more and more important. 
Until 1986, the impact of European integration on the activities of the SHIV 
remained rather marginal and limited to specific topics. The main themes were 
minor adaptations, clarifications or revisions of the free trade agreement between 
EEC and EFTA concluded in 1972, the simplification of the rules of origin, guide-
lines for a common European product liability law, the adjustment of trademark 
rights in the member states and the question how the non-member states could 
participate in these simplifications.6 One major concern was the tendency, in a pe-
riod marked by a worldwide recession and high unemployment rates in the EEC-
countries, to raise trade barriers between the European free trade area and the 
EEC. With the economic upswing felt since 1983 the apprehension of a new wave 
of protectionism disappeared, but it was feared that the project of creating a single 
European market would lead to the creation of new boundaries for economic ex-
change within Europe. A possible counter measure was to conclude an agreement 
between the EFTA and the EEC in order to avoid such an outcome.7 Still, the 
                                                           
5 In 1990 the members of the SHIV were: 19 cantonal chambers of commerce, 100 branch associa-
tions (of a large number of industries and services) and 6 other member organisations.  
6 SHIV, Annual Reports 1980/81, pp. 39 ff.; 1982/83, pp. 75 ff.; 1983/84 pp. 74 f.  
7 SHIV, Annual Report 1982/83, pp. 59 ff. 
SHIV did not want to have its hands tied to a regional system. The degree of eco-
nomic integration with the EEC-area was high, but about 40% of total Swiss ex-
ports were delivered to non-European markets and direct investments in overseas 
countries were considerable. According to the SHIV, Switzerland had primarily to 
take an active part in the GATT-negotiations, which had started in November 
1982. The international organisations OECD and UNO also acted as rule-setters 
with regard to international trade and the behaviour of multinational companies, 
but their impact was regarded as rather marginal, because they produced mainly 
‘soft rules’, which could be applied voluntarily. Their guidelines were mere rec-
ommendations, limited to identifying problems and suggesting solutions.8 
During the early 1980s the EEC as rule setter was completely absent. Most ma-
jor topics of economic policy, such as competition and energy policy or the revi-
sion of the sales tax and of the law on cartels, were discussed without any refer-
ence to the European context. That was even the case for the first steps towards 
deregulating the telecommunication sector initiated in 1984.9 Quite generally, de-
regulation and privatisation were considered as purely domestic topics.10 Research 
and development (R&D) was the only field of economic policy directly influenced 
by a programme of the European Commission for promoting science and technol-
ogy during the period 1984–87. At first, the SHIV was sceptical with regard to the 
role of the state in stimulating R&D, although, compared with other European 
countries, the high share of private companies in total R&D expenditures in Swit-
zerland was perceived as exceptional.11 But international competition in R&D be-
came more pronounced, and the SHIV was concerned about the fact that the in-
crease of R&D expenditures of Swiss firms abroad was higher than at home. The 
state-backed participation in international and especially EC R&D-programmes 
was reconsidered and finally approved. At the same time, domestic policies pro-
moting R&D were strengthened. 12 
From 1987 onwards, the creation of the single European market and its conse-
quences for the Swiss economy became the dominant theme and determined the 
agenda for institutional reforms: Deregulation and privatisation of state-owned en-
terprises in Switzerland were a matter of concern, because Switzerland was lag-
ging behind compared with EEC-countries,13 and the service sector was identified 
as an important area of liberalisation, because the EEC assigned high priority to 
this topic in completing the single European market.14 This ambitious programme 
embraced all major service sectors (financial services, transport and traffic sys-
tems, telecommunication, capital transactions) and included tax regulations as 
                                                           
8 SHIV, Annual Reports 1980/81, pp. 66 ff.; 1982/83, pp. 85 ff.; 1983/84, pp. 79 ff.; 1984/85 pp. 
70 ff.  
9 SHIV, Annual Report 1984/85, pp. 42 ff. 
10 SHIV, Annual Report 1985/86, p. 12 
11 SHIV, Annual Report 1982/83, pp. 39 ff. Public expenditures amounted to only about one quar-
ter of total expenditures for R&D. 
12 SHIV, Annual Reports 1985/86, pp. 32 f., pp. 108 f.; 1986/87, pp. 117 ff.; 1987/88, p. 29 
13 SHIV, Annual Report 1987/88, p. 7 
14 Ibid., pp. 36 ff. 
well as measures for promoting the free movement of labour. Even agrarian policy 
was no longer conceived as a purely internal affair. The agrarian sector was com-
ing under pressure both from the single European market and the Uruguay-round 
of the GATT.15 How should Switzerland react to all these challenges?16 The im-
mediate effect of the decision to create a single European market for services, was 
increased uncertainty. Switzerland seemed ill prepared for this type of market in-
tegration. Little room of manoeuvre was perceived with regard to banking and 
transport services. In the field of telecommunication it seemed inevitable for Swit-
zerland to cooperate with the EEC, and the same was the case for the energy sec-
tor. 
According to the SHIV what was going on in Europe had to become an integral 
part of the internal discussion on economic policies.17 But the GATT-negotiations 
should not get out of sight, because the Uruguay-round was to determine the rules 
valid for international trade in the years to come, independently of whether they 
were a success or not.18 It was important for Swiss firms to remain competitive on 
markets outside the EEC. A large part of Swiss exports were directed to overseas 
markets, and economic growth rates were higher in the US and in Asia than in the 
European countries.19 
One possibility for coping with the changing conditions within Europe were 
measures, which could be taken autonomously, such as strengthening the competi-
tiveness of the Swiss economy in general or reducing the potential for conflicts 
with the EEC.20 One proposition was to replace the existing sales tax with a value 
added tax, another to develop an acceptable solution for the transit traffic through 
the Alps.21 A promising way out of the threatening division of Europe was the 
proposal of the European Commission to expand the ‘four freedoms’ of the single 
market for goods, services, persons and capital to the EFTA-countries and create a 
European Economic Area (EEA).22 This proposal was the main topic of the EFTA 
Summit-Meeting in March 1989. Discussions revealed different positions: Austria 
intended to apply for EC-membership, Sweden and Norway aimed at full partici-
pation within the single European market, Switzerland was in favour of an exten-
sive cooperation with the EEC, but had to respect the constraints imposed by the 
internal political situation.23 For the SHIV the main question was how the ex-
panded single market would have to be conceived in order to be acceptable for the 
large majority of firms in the main branches of the Swiss economy.24 
                                                           
15 Ibid., pp. 101 ff. 
16 Ibid. pp. 39-47 
17 Ibid., p. 46; SHIV, Annual Report 1990, pp. 8 f. 
18 SHIV, Annual Report 1987/88, p. 62 
19 SHIV, Annual Report 1988/89, pp. 7, 35 
20 SHIV, Annual Report 1989/90, p. 29  
21 SHIV, Annual Report 1988/89, pp. 29, 39 f. 
22 Ibid., p. 48 
23 Ibid., pp. 52 f. 
24 SHIV, Annual Report 1989/90, pp. 25 ff. 
At the end of the 1980s the international economic context the SHIV tried to 
cope with had become extremely complex, and the process of European integra-
tion continued at a very fast pace. Already in December 1990 there were confer-
ences on the creation of a monetary and a political union. Austria applied for EC 
membership in 1989 and Sweden planned to do so in 1991. Even countries in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe aimed at joining the European Community.25 For the 
SHIV, an organisation used to the slow pace of institutional change in Switzerland 
– where every modification has to go through various rounds of consultations be-
fore it is presented in parliament, and after having been accepted in parliament 
there is still the possibility of a referendum – the pace of European integration 
must have been breathtaking. 
The increasing importance of the EEC was also reflected in the decision taken 
in 1988 to establish an office in Brussels. At that time, the SHIV was the only 
member of the UNICE without a permanent representation. The strengthened link 
with UNICE was conceived as a major and direct source of information on EC-
matters for Swiss firms, especially for the large number of small and medium-
sized enterprises.26 
The process of establishing the EEA clearly dominated the agenda up to 
autumn 1992. The tendency was to shift pending negotiations (for example simpli-
fying the rules of origin) into the EEA-package.27 In several fields of legislation 
the influence of European integration became stronger: the committee in charge of 
the revision of the Swiss Corporation Law, for example, noticed a contradiction 
with EC-notions and took it into account; the enactment of the EC-guideline on 
product liability immediately provoked corresponding activities of the EFTA-
states and the revision of the Swiss liability law;28 also with regard to foreign la-
bour, the creation of the EEA gave rise to rules that complied with the EC.29 How-
ever, in some areas the influence of EC-rules was still limited or even firmly re-
jected. Rather surprisingly, such an attitude prevailed with regard to the reform of 
the law on cartels. According to the SHIV the ban on cartels imposed by the EC 
competition law was restricted to the international exchange of goods and serv-
ices, while the Swiss competition law allowing cartels with certain restrictions re-
mained valid for the domestic market.30 The extension of the regulating activities 
of the European Commission from the single market programme towards labour 
market and social policies was observed with apprehension, but these topics were 
not part of the EEA-negotiations yet.31 
In the view of the SHIV, the EEA was basically a good idea, but it also raised a 
major problem: the EFTA countries had to integrate all the relevant laws (the ‘Ac-
quis communautaires’) into their national legal order. Hopes of obtaining the same 
                                                           
25 SHIV, Annual Report 1990, pp. 35 f. 
26 SHIV, Annual Reports 1988/89, p. 50; 1989/90, pp. 11 f.  
27 SHIV, Annual Report 1989/90, p. 59 
28 SHIV, Annual Report 1988/89, pp. 128 ff. 
29 SHIV, Annual Reports 1989/90, pp. 114 ff.; 1990, pp. 198 ff.  
30 SHIV, Annual Report 1991, pp. 79 ff. 
31 SHIV, Annual Report 1990, p. 15 
rights as the EC-countries in the decision-making process, or at least some possi-
bility to deviate from EC-rules were quickly squashed. For the EFTA-countries 
the situation was clear enough: total autonomy of the EC and total homogeneity of 
the EEA. This implied that in all current and future areas regulated by the EC the 
EFTA-countries had to adapt their national legislation without being able to par-
ticipate in the decision-making process.32 Under these circumstances, joining the 
EC became more attractive and the EEA was increasingly perceived as a transi-
tional agreement: Sweden applied for membership in the EC in July 1991 and Fin-
land in March 1992.33 For the SHIV, joining the EC was still no option, because it 
was assumed that there was no majority in case of a referendum on such a step.  
The other alternative was characterised as ‘splendid isolation’ and was dismissed 
as an illusionary concept. The only realistic option was an EEA-treaty that was ac-
ceptable for both sides.34 In June 1990 negotiations were taken up, and representa-
tives of the SHIV participated in several of the negotiating groups.  Negotiations 
were reported as difficult, for institutional and legal reasons and for the fact, that 
the EC had linked the question of transit traffic with the treaty on the EEA.35 In 
the course of the negotiations all obstacles were overcome, but the result was sat-
isfactory only as a transitional agreement. After negotiations had been concluded 
in October 1991 the participating ministers of the Swiss Federal Government de-
clared that the final objective for Switzerland was to join the EC and that the 
EEA-Treaty was a useful step on the way to complete integration.36 
On the basis of a broad internal survey among its members the SHIV approved 
the EEA-Treaty and the objective to join the EC later on was commented on fa-
vourably.37 But such a step should be made only after the EEA-Treaty had been 
accepted in the compulsory referendum scheduled for September 1992 and the 
EC-law (EUROLEX) integrated into Swiss law. In its external communication the 
SHIV made great efforts in convincing the voters of the advantages of the EEA for 
the Swiss economy, but its impact was, of course, limited by the activities of other 
interest groups.38 
 
ASSOCIATION OF THE SWISS MACHINE INDUSTRIALISTS (VSM) 
 
The VSM and its numerous subgroups were all members of the corresponding 
European associations, where all information concerning the EEC was available 
quickly and reliably. The main European connection was ORGALIME (Organ-
isme de Liaison des Industries Métalliques Européennes).39 The VSM participated 
actively in the various working groups and committees. While practically all the 
                                                           
32 SHIV, Annual Report 1990,  pp. 36 ff. 
33 SHIV, Annual Report 1991, pp. 31 f. 
34 SHIV, Annual Report 1990, p. 40 
35 Ibid., p. 57 
36 SHIV, Annual Report 1991, p. 29 
37 Ibid., pp. 30 ff., 52 f. 
38 SHIV, Annual Report 1991, p. 12 
39 VSM, Annual Reports 1988, p. 18, and 1990, p. 14 
subgroups were linked with European associations of the same branches, only 
very few participated also in worldwide associations.40 The annual reports of the 
VSM contain little information on the activities of these groups, but it seems that 
their main objective during the late 1980s and early 1990s was the harmonization 
of Swiss regulations and norms with European regulations and norms in order to 
avoid competitive disadvantages for Swiss firms on the EC-market. Special com-
mittees of the VSM were continuously observing the revisions of legal rules in 
Switzerland, in the European context and on the international level. These com-
mittees intervened on the national level by commenting on drafts for new rules 
and indicating possible problems if the proposed regulation was not harmonized 
with the corresponding EC-guidelines. Some members of the VSM were active in 
the committee on intellectual property of the SHIV and in working groups of 
UNICE.41 
From 1988 onwards the creation of the European single market and its conse-
quences for the Swiss firms in the machine industry was the main theme dealt with 
in the annual reports. The topics discussed were: product liability, the rules for 
certification and examination, patent law, trademark protection law and copy 
right. In the field of technical harmonization great importance was attached to the 
Greenbook on the development of European norms for the realisation of the single 
European market.42 
The EEA-negotiations were initiated in 1989. The member firms were continu-
ously kept informed in “Europa-Seminarien” and workshops. Quite generally, 
European integration had a high priority in the public relations activities of the as-
sociation.43 The attitude of the VSM was clear: As long as the regulations in Swit-
zerland differed, the Swiss manufacturers had a disadvantage compared to their 
competitors in the EEC. Consequently, such differences had to be eliminated or 
avoided.44 The result of a survey among the VSM-members showed a broad ap-
proval of this position.45 This attitude also prevailed in some fields, which had 
been previously excluded from integration (namely energy and water supplies, 
traffic systems and telecommunication). A survey revealed that more than 86% of 
the firms agreed to open those markets for the whole EEA.46 With regard to R&D 
policies, the attitude of the VSM was less ambiguous than the position of the 
SHIV. It claimed full participation of Switzerland in the EC-programmes and, 
with regard to financial support, similar conditions as for the firms in the other EC 
and EFTA countries.47 This aim was achieved in 1991.48 The result of another sur-
                                                           
40 In this period, there were about a dozen subgroups. VSM, Annual Reports 1988-1991 
41 VSM, Annual Report 1989, p. 53 ff. 
42 VSM, Annual Report 1990, p. 10 
43 VSM, Annual Report 1988, p. 11; Annual Report 1989, p. 9; Annual Report 1990, p. 7; Annual 
Report 1991, p. 24 
44 VSM, Annual Reports 1988, p. 10, and 1989, p. 9 f. 
45 VSM, Annual Report 1989, p. 11 
46 VSM, Annual Report 1990, p. 9 
47 VSM, Annual Reports 1989, p. 11, and 1990, p. 13 
48 VSM, Annual Report 1991, p. 11 f. 
vey on the question whether Switzerland should accept the EEA-Treaty were also 
clear-cut: 90% of the firms approved, and the remaining 10% favoured direct 
membership in the EC, no firm voted to go it alone.49 
Notwithstanding the priority assigned to European integration, high importance 
was also attributed to the GATT-negotiations.50 Given the hectic pace prevailing 
in the EEC, the VSM feared that the process of European integration might delay 
the successful conclusion of the Uruguay round. For the Swiss machine industry 
an open world trade system was almost as important as participating in the single 
European market, since over a third of the exports of the machine industry were 
delivered to other world regions.51 
 
SWISS SOCIETY OF CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES (SSCI) 
 
The chemical-pharmaceutical industry is one of the most globally oriented 
Swiss industries. The European market was important, especially for imports, but 
since the late 1970s the US have been the most attractive market because of higher 
income levels and growth rates and a less regulated health sector. The Swiss Soci-
ety of Chemical Industries (SSCI) had links with other national and international 
business associations and its delegates participated in a large number of govern-
mental committees.52 In national policy matters, the SSCI usually intervened indi-
rectly as a member of the SHIV. On the international level links with the Euro-
pean Chemical Association had been established right from its foundation in 1959. 
The whole network included around fifteen international organisations, of which 
about two thirds were European associations. 
Due to its global orientation, the main interest with regard to international trade 
was a liberal world trade system without protectionist policies and trade barriers. 
These objectives were pursued on the level of the GATT, but progress was slow 
and the results of the various rounds of negotiations disappointing. Also for the 
SSCI, the EEC as rule-setter remained marginal up to the middle of the 1980s, its 
impact was limited to questions of origin and the customs tariff between EC and 
EFTA. The basis for negotiations was the European free trade agreement con-
cluded in 1972. With regard to such questions, cooperation with CEFIC (European 
Chemical Industry Council) proved highly satisfactory.53  
At first, plans of the EEC to create a single European market were a matter of 
concern, because the SSCI feared the formation of trade blocs. In its perspective, 
the European Chemical Association had an important role in preventing such an 
outcome.54 The section on foreign trade of the SSCI was concerned about the 
changing relationship between EEC and EFTA. The position of Switzerland was 
clearly weakened, because EFTA was losing members and often the remaining 
                                                           
49 Ibid., p. 8 
50 VSM, Annual Report 1988, p. 11 
51 Ibid., p. 19; VSM Annual Report 1989, p. 11 
52 SGCI, Annual Reports, 1981 to 1992 
53 SGCI, Annual Report 1985, p. 10 
54 SGCI, Annual Report 1984, p. 11 
members did not support the Swiss position. The question was how to avoid the 
marginalisation of Switzerland. The SSCI favoured approaching the EEC by the 
means of bilateral agreements and to strive for parallelism of the law setting proc-
ess in Switzerland. Joining the EC was out of question for well-known reasons.55 
Other areas of concern, namely health and environmental protection as well as 
transports of dangerous goods were dealt with either in the national context or on 
the international level (UNO, WHO, UNEC, FAO, GATT; OECD). The influence 
of the EEC in matters of traffic and transport became more pronounced only in the 
early 1990s. The special problems related to trade with pharmaceuticals, namely 
the increasing intervention of the state on price-setting policies, was not perceived 
as a specific European problem. Similar tendencies were present in countries of 
other world regions too. These tendencies were strongest in some important Euro-
pean countries, but it was the result of their national policies and not of European 
integration. The situation changed with the creation of the single European market 
and the EEA. 
The chemical-pharmaceutical industry was clearly the leader with regard to 
R&D expenditures in Switzerland. Not surprisingly, the means to protect trade-
marks and patents were of major interest. Also in this respect, the influence of the 
EEC was absent in the early 1980s. These topics were dealt with either on the na-
tional level or within international organisations (OECD, UNCTAD, GATT). In 
the case of patent protection, the national rules became more efficient, but also 
less important, because Swiss firms rarely used the national channels for patent 
protection. The EEC played an active role with regard to product liability and con-
sumer protection, strongly influenced by developments in the US. In the late 
1980s and early1990s, developments in the EEC strongly influenced the national 
law-setting processes also with regard to the law on trademarks and patents.56 
Quite generally, new legislation in the national context was approved if the devel-
opments in the EEC were taken into account; the process of legislation was sus-
pended, if the corresponding process within the EEC was uncertain. 
The attitude of the SSCI with regard to the creation of a single European mar-
ket was in general quite positive. The society campaigned for the ‘Europafähig-
keit’ of the chemical industry in Switzerland. Renouncing on ‘customised’ Swiss 
guidelines for environmental protection was a possibility to demonstrate solidarity 
with Europe and the positive attitude of the Swiss chemical industry towards the 
single market. The official acknowledgment of the concept of ‘Europafähigkeit’ as 
an aim of economic policy, implying strengthening the competitiveness of Swiss 
firms in general and establishing legal compatibility with EC rules was highly 
welcomed.57 Avoiding disparities between EC guidelines and Swiss regulations 
was a main objective of the SSCI.  
The SSCI had regular contacts to the Swiss delegations negotiating the EEA 
agreement. In 1991, the agreement was described as unbalanced, inadequate as a 
durable instrument of integration. Consequently, the SSCI would approve the 
                                                           
55 SGCI, Annual Report 1986, p. 10. 
56 SGCI, Annual Reports 1988, p. 27, and 1991, p. 28 
57 SGCI, Annual Report 1988, pp. 5 and 8 
treaty only if, subsequently, Switzerland joined the EC. The association suggested 
that the federal government deposit an application for membership. Only under 
these circumstances, the SSCI would be able to agree to the Treaty on the EEA.58 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the position of the SSCI had become clearly pro-
European. In its view, the EEA was acceptable as a temporary, transitional solu-
tion, but in the long term, only full membership in the EC was the adequate form 
of relationship. 
Notwithstanding its strong involvement in the EEA negotiations, the SSCI con-
tinued to support all activities aiming at expanding and strengthening the liberal 
world trade system. The necessary condition was the successful conclusion of the 
Uruguay round of the GATT. 
 
SCHWEIZERISCHER GEWERBEVERBAND (SGV) 
 
The SGV is the federation of the mainly inward-oriented branches of the Swiss 
economy. Consequently, domestic topics dominated even in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, when European integration became a major theme even for this or-
ganisation. The SGV participated in a large number of federal committees and in 
the organisations of tertiary education, but it had only two links with international 
organisations: the ‘Conférence internationale du travail’ and the ‘Union interna-
tionale de l’artisanat et des petites et moyennes enterprise’ (Internationale Gewer-
beunion, IGU).59 The SGV was not a member organisation of the SHIV, but often 
cooperated with regard to specific topics. 
The annual reports contain little information on the activities of the SGV and its 
subgroups. Up to 1989, developments regarding EEC, EFTA and EEA are men-
tioned very briefly. In the view of the SGV, those topics concerned first of all the 
export-oriented sectors of the economy. Even if it was acknowledged that the 
creation of a single European market was important also for the internal market, 
these effects were perceived as rather marginal. The federation adopted a defen-
sive attitude and focused on those areas and rules, which should be kept untouched 
from developments in the EEC.60  
Only in the early 1990s, the formation of the EEA was acknowledged as a main 
theme of economic policy in Switzerland and commented on more extensively. 
Having largely neglected this policy area, the SGV was hardly able to keep pace 
with the rapid developments on the European level.61 The member firms asked for 
more information with regard to European integration, and therefore a working 
group was established in 1990. It had the task to analyse the possible alternative 
scenarios for the relationship of Switzerland with the EEA and the EC.62 But since 
                                                           
58 SGCI, Annual Report 1991, p. 9 
59 In 1991, the SGV had delegates in 86 domestic commissions and interest groups. SGV, Annual 
Report 1991, pp. 65 f. 
60 SGV, Annual Report 1989, p. 25 ff. These areas were: the agrarian sector, road traffic and the 
rules for trucks, competition law, foreign labour policy and the public purchasing regulations. 
61 VSG, Annual Report 1990, p. 27 
62 SGV, Annual Report 1990, p. 9 ff. 
it was still unclear what the EEA-treaty would look like, the working group simply 
assumed, as a starting point, that Switzerland would join neither the EEA nor the 
EC.63 
In 1991, the EEA was the main theme in the section on economic policy of the 
annual report. It was now clear that the EEA agreement would have important 
consequences for the national laws in various fields (cartel law, submission law, 
technical norms, product liability, copy right, agrarian policy, property laws, regu-
lations on foreign labour, corporation law, the education and social systems, con-
sumer law, etc.). Overwhelmed by all these changes, the Committee of the SGV 
decided that the EEA was politically unacceptable.64 In its view, the successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay-round of the GATT was to form a kind of safety net for 
small export dependent countries and a means to deal with the obstacles, which 
would inevitably result from the creation of the EEA.65 
The EEA and the single market were the dominant themes also in 1992. The 
consequences of joining the EEA in various fields were now commented on more 
extensively.66 The adaptations included in the EUROLEX-package amounted to 
the modifications of about 60 laws and 100 regulations.67 Nonetheless, at the ex-
traordinary ‘Schweizerischer Gewerbekongress’ in September 1992 (the second 
extraordinary congress since the foundation of the SGV in 1879), the delegates of 
all member organisations said ‘yes’ to the EEA (with 549:456 votes). The major-
ity of the delegates may have been convinced of the advantages of joining the 
EEA, especially for the large number of sub-suppliers of the export-industries, the 
minority was probably scared by the far-reaching and uncertain consequences of 
accepting the EEA-Treaty. 
 
 
THE REJECTION OF THE EEA AND ITS IMPACT 
ON THE PROCESS OF EUROPEANIZATION 
 
Notwithstanding the broad support from the main business associations, the 
Treaty on the EEA was rejected in the referendum voted on December 6, 1992, 
with a small majority of votes (50,3%) and a large majority of the cantons (16:7).68 
Resistance had mainly been organised by the right wing party, the ‘Schweize-
rische Volkspartei’ (SVP). For the export-oriented business associations the nega-
tive result of the referendum came as a shock. The path of ‘going it alone’ had 
been chosen, a path, which the SHIV had dismissed as illusionary and practically 
excluded as a possible alternative. 
                                                           
63 VSM, Annual Report 1990, p. 11 
64 SGV, Annual Report 1991, p. 22 f. 
65 SGV, Annual Report 1990, p. 28 
66 SGV, Annual Report 1992, p. 36 f. (labour law); p. 41 ff. (foreign labour); p. 43 ff.: competition 
and consumer policy; p. 54 (product liability). 
67 Ibid., p. 22 
68 SHIV, Annual Report 1992, pp. 8 f. 
The immediate reaction of the Swiss government to the negative result of the 
referendum was to proceed with the implementation of the EUROLEX-package, 
just as if it had been accepted.69 The main objective in the longer term was to ne-
gotiate bilateral agreements with the EU in order to reach a similar level of eco-
nomic integration as the countries within the EEA. The SHIV fully supported this 
programme of minimising any negative consequences. All options vis-à-vis 
Europe had to be kept open and all measures improving the competitiveness of 
Swiss firms in the EU-market were to be undertaken immediately.70 The strategy 
pursued before had been to achieve substantial economic reforms by participating 
in the EEA. This strategy had become obsolete and had to be replaced by an 
autonomous programme of internal reform in order to avoid any discrimination re-
sulting from differences between the Swiss and the European legal systems.  
In the literature on institutional change in Switzerland it is widely acknowl-
edged that the impact of European integration on institutional change continued to 
be quite strong.71 However, given the new room of manoeuvre, it was no longer 
necessary to accept the whole package of the ‘Acquis communautaires’.72 Taking 
part in the process of European integration had to be balanced against possible 
disadvantages in non-EU markets. Competition law was one of those areas where 
the SHIV wanted to stick to the weaker domestic rules.73 Wide room was also 
dedicated to the discussion of the different attitudes of the EC and Switzerland 
with regard to the energy industry. In this respect, the SHIV relied on the Euro-
pean Energy-Charta, where Switzerland continued to participate as fully-fledged 
partner. With regard to the liberalisation of the Swiss postal services, the Green-
book of the EC remained an important point of reference.74 
The importance of Europe as the main market for exports and imports had also 
changed, not so much with regard to the actual shares of exports and imports in 
GDP, but with regard to future prospects. Europe’s growth rates, especially those 
of the large countries were low, while the US economy and the economies of the 
Far East were booming. The shift of attention towards the higher level of world 
wide economic integration is visible already in 1993. Being able to represent the 
interests of Swiss industry by taking part in the various activities of UNICE was 
perceived as being even more important than before the rejection of the EAA, but 
more weight was also given to supporting the successful conclusion of the Uru-
guay round within the GATT. 75 
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CONCLUSION 
 
From about 1985, when the EEC decided to create a single European market, 
up to 1992, European integration had a deep impact on institutional change in 
Switzerland. The influence of other international organisations (GATT/WTO, 
OECD, UNO) was much weaker during this period, not because their regulatory 
reforms were considered less important, but because they proceeded at a very slow 
pace and were often considered as ‘soft rules’. In several fields, the EEC became 
the main agent of institutional change.  
The challenge, but also the opportunities offered by the creation of the single 
European market were clearly perceived, and usually positive effects on the Swiss 
economy were stressed.76 The outward-oriented business organisations SHIV, 
VSM and SSCI became involved at an early stage of the negotiations and basi-
cally welcomed the process of European integration. The participation of Switzer-
land in this process was a matter of course, their links with the European associa-
tions were strengthened and their views were increasingly shaped by the European 
context. These business associations were clearly exerting pressure on the public 
authorities for making national legislation compatible with the rules established 
within the EC. Their main objective was to avoid competitive disadvantages for 
their member firms in the European market. The means to achieve this objective 
gradually shifted from some form of participation in the single European market to 
accepting the Treaty on the EEA as a first step towards membership in the Euro-
pean Community. The main inward oriented association, the SGV, took little in-
terest in the process of European integration and its impact on institutional change 
was marginal. 
The tendency to minimise competitive disadvantages for Swiss firms by adapt-
ing to EC standards and rules clearly prevailed during the pre-voting period. The 
areas subjected to EC rules were continuously extended and finally culminated in 
the EUROLEX-Package containing all adaptations of internal legislation de-
manded by the EEA-Treaty. European integration was not stopped after the refer-
endum in 1992, but continued with other means and somewhat changed objec-
tives. But the end result of the process was highly uncertain and time consuming, 
because the harmonization of a large body of legislation with EC rules became 
again a matter of internal debate. The intensification and extension of the relation-
ship to the EU-countries remained one of the main objectives of economic policy. 
As an important ‘area of attention’ the EU had become firmly integrated into the 
horizon of Swiss firms and their business associations. 
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